Strategy and Tactics

by Mikal Jakubal

It has been said that the first duty if a revolutionary is to win the revolution. Likewise, the first duty of an earth warrior is to save the earth. All other considerations become secondary. In other words: No Compromise-Earth First! Fulfilling this obligation demands of earth warriors all the inner and outer strength that can be mustered. It demands commitment and unwavering persistence in the face of hardship, courage under fire, sacrifice, patience and humility. No movement lacking such personal qualities can ever hope to succeed. However, these qualities alone are not enough. The fundamental strategic imperative is to outperform the adversary. To accomplish this task requires a thorough knowledge of the chosen technique of struggle.

There are many possible techniques of waging political conflicts: within-the-system work, pacifism, full-scale military warfare, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, nonviolent action and others. Were Earth First! to adopt, say, guerrilla warfare as our chosen technique, we would more than likely do extensive study of its strategy, tactics, methods and history. We would read up on Zapata, Crazy Horse, the Viet Cong, the FMLN and the modern-day Zapatistas. In short, we would take it seriously. If we are to choose nonviolent action as the preferred technique of struggle, we need to devote ourselves to a comprehensive understanding of its history, methods, strategic requirements and dynamics. Such is the intent of this and future pieces.

My own activist history spans 13 years of practical experience with Earth First! with concurrent research and study into the whole spectrum of social change movements. The motivation for this present effort is a desire to share some of this information to hopefully help the movement become more effective and help newer activists avoid a repeat of past mistakes-mistakes that cost forests and other endangered ecosystems.

Strategic Action Planning

The reason we engage in nonviolent action is to influence behavior, specifically, behavior that is felt to be ecologically destructive or unjust. The main factor influencing whether we use a particular method of action or continue to use it in the future is that action's predicted or perceived "effectiveness." In other words, will that action in fact lead to the desired change in behavior? For the purpose of this essay, a "goal" will be defined as one or more of these changes or effects. Determining appropriate goals requires an understanding of the source of political power and the complex nature of the effects of nonviolent action.

According to nonviolent action theory, political power arises continuously from a multitude of sources within society, as opposed to emanating from the few at the top; it is unstable and subject to change, instead of being monolithic and durable. Most importantly, it is dependent on the obedience, support and cooperation of the very people subject to such political power. The power of a ruler (or corporation, etc.) may be controlled by the granting, continuation or withdrawal of this support and cooperation upon which the ability to rule depends. Thus, instead of confronting power head-on as in most violent conflict, the proper use of nonviolence allows us to indirectly challenge power by controlling it at its sources.

When a small group wishes to challenge an injustice perpetuated by an immensely more powerful opponent, the path to victory lies in a radical-at the root- altering of the relative ability of each side to wield political power. Activists consciously seeking to change this power relationship will choose methods, tactics and strategies of action that affect the sources of power (i.e., support and cooperation by a multitude of people) for both contending groups. "Effectiveness" will then be evaluated not so much on whether or not some superficial objective was achieved (e.g., did the blockade actually shut down the bridge for a significant length of time?) but on whether or not the action led to a change in behavior on the part of those on either side.

The topic of the nature and control of political power is extremely complex; it has been the subject of innumerable volumes over the last several centuries alone. I wish to put forth a basic three-phase procedure for nonviolent action: 1) strategic analysis; 2) goal setting and 3) tactics. This procedure can be used by activists to determine which actions will achieve the greatest possible effect with the least effort.

Analysis, Goals, Tactics-In That Order

"Goal" has been defined as "a change in behavior by someone." The point of strategic analysis is to define "what change" and "by whom." We can roughly divide people into three groupings: the general grievance group; the opponent and uncommitted third parties (most of the population). All of these people either provide support and assistance to us, provide it to our opponents or could provide it to either side. The second part of strategic analysis, the desired change in behavior, is based on the type of support or resistance given or potentially given by these groups to the contending sides. It is a premise of nonviolent action theory that this behavior and therefore the relative power position of both sides is highly variable and subject to influence by the actions of either side in the course of a struggle.

In conducting a strategic evaluation it may be useful to actually write down a list of all the various subgroups involved and the type of support each gives or could give to each side. This may prove to be a very revealing brainstorming tool for planning meetings. For example, a partial listing for the Headwaters forest campaign might look something like the table on the right:

Us: Earth First!; Environmental Protection Information Center (EPIC, though not involved in nonviolent action per se, does legal work that plays a large part in how a campaign unfolds.)

Our usual supporters: large numbers of environmentally-oriented individuals; various mainstream groups; Redwood Rabbis; Taxpayers for Headwaters; Food Not Bombs; KMUD Radio and other sympathetic media; the Civil Liberties Monitoring Project and many individuals who are not environmentalists but who agree in general with our cause (passive supporters).

Them: Charles Hurwitz, CEO of Maxxam, the parent company of Pacific Lumber (PL), the company responsible for logging the old-growth Headwaters redwoods; the corporate management of Maxxam and Pacific Lumber (PL); the Humboldt County Sheriff and District Attorney; many top officials of the California Department of Forestry (CDF); the Board of Forestry; various industry leaders and certain cops and loggers who ideologically or personally hate us.

Their usual supporters: employees of Maxxam; employees of Pacific Lumber; employees of CDF, Humboldt County, etc.; explicitly anti-environmental groups such as Wise Use, Yellow Ribbon Coalition, etc.; Maxxam and PL shareholders; purchasers of old-growth redwood products and the retailers and distributors who sell them; taxpayers in Humboldt County (who fund the Sheriff and District Attorney); individuals who ideologically support Hurwitz's "right" to log "his" property (passive supporters) and individuals who ideologically dislike EF! but take no immediate action against us (though they may readily do so in the future).

Uncommitted third parties: most of the public; the media; fishing groups; employees of Maxxam, Pacific Lumber, CDF, Humboldt County and so on who are "just doing their job"; unions; church and civic groups and city and county governments.

Even the table's incomplete listing is enormous and in itself hints at the diversity of possible actions. From here it is possible to evaluate current and potential support for or opposition to either side by each subgroup and to assess both the likelihood of possible shifts in allegiance and avenues toward these shifts. In other words, what role does each group play and how could that role change to benefit our cause?

Any of these subgroups may, as influenced by events in the struggle, take one of the following courses of action: 1) move to a position of active support for either contending party; 2) move to a position of active opposition to either party; 3) withdraw from active support for or opposition to either party and move to a neutral position or 4) any of these people may maintain their present position and level of activity.

The next step, determining appropriate goals, requires that we ask critical and relevant questions: Which groups' support is currently the most important to Hurwitz? To us? Which uncommitted third parties can be turned against Hurwitz and the California Department of Forestry? Which of our passive supporters can be encouraged to become more active-and how? And so on. We now have a sound basis for decisions as to which specific behavior changes by which specific people are most needed. The next step is to choose a course of action which will lead to these changes, that is, fulfill our goals.

Once a specific goal has been identified, the planning of an action to achieve it requires choosing a method to do so and tactical planning ("action planning"). A "method" as used here is a type or form of activity. Tree-sit, blockade, rally, general strike, boycott-these are methods of action. A tactic is a means to create a limited confrontation within a larger strategic plan, and consists of one or more methods used to achieve the stated goal. Consideration must be given to such factors as timing, terrain, appropriate message, maintaining the initiative, quality vs. quantity of activists needed and so forth.

As an outline, the strategic action planning process looks like this:

1. Strategic Analysis: Which groups are involved? How are they involved? How can their involvement change to benefit our cause?

2. Goal Setting: Decide which person or group needs to change their behavior and how.

3. Tactics: Formulate actions to influence this change. Consider proper combination of methods, timing, location, message, etc.

An action should almost always have multiple goals. This way several may be achieved for an overall positive effect even if the main objective was not successfully reached. At any given time during a campaign there will likely be many groups whose shift in loyalty could greatly influence the political power of the two sides. An action achieving a beneficial shift in participation from any of the above subgroups can be said to be effective. Understanding this is crucial to proper planning. Remember that nonviolent action works indirectly by undermining the sources of power (some would say this is actually very direct). With a typical EF!-style blockade where massive numbers sufficient to completely and permanently obstruct an operation are not available, the actual shut-down of operations is rarely the primary goal, and an action's effectiveness should not be judged on whether or not this happened. Thus, all the jargon about "shutting down operations at the point of production" is misleading and, if taken too seriously, will result in an excessive emphasis on methods and tactics involving confrontations with loggers and cops and missed strategic opportunities elsewhere. Following the steps of strategic action planning can avoid this and other common mistakes and thereby make the hard work, risk and suffering of serious struggle effective and meaningful.

I welcome constructive feedback and questions on the content of this piece. Letters for publication may be directed to the Journal. Other correspondence may be sent to me directly at POB 5, Redway, CA 95560.